



# The Limitations of the Expert

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## Introduction by Leslie Lenkowsky

“Trust the experts!” That may be the catch phrase of the coronavirus pandemic. At one time or another, it’s been used by Donald J. Trump and Nancy Pelosi, Governors and Mayors regardless of political party, university presidents and business leaders, journalists and bloggers, and many others to urge the public to follow the guidance of public health specialists in order to prevent Covid 19 from becoming more harmful than it already was.

Was that good advice? Leave aside the questions of who is an expert and what is to be done when they disagree (as happens more than occasionally). Is expert knowledge really sufficient to guide a country – indeed, the world – through a crisis with profound economic, social, and political ramifications, as well as health consequences?

To British political theorist Harold J. Laski (1893–1950), the answer would surely have been “No.” All but forgotten today, Laski was one of the most influential intellectuals of the first half of the twentieth century. (To the extent Laski is remembered at all, it may be principally because he is one of two people singled out by George Orwell, in an often-cited essay “Politics and the English Language,” for their convoluted writing.) He was a faculty member at Harvard, Yale and the London School of Economics, prolific author of books and articles, friend to the likes of Felix Frankfurter, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., and Walter Lippmann, and not least of all active in Labour Party politics, eventually becoming its chairman after it regained power at the end of the Second

World War. Despite his own accomplishments, he believed that good government required more than the expertise of scholars to succeed.

Laski expressed this view most fully in “The Limitations of the Expert,” a pamphlet published by the Fabian Society in 1931 and brought back into print here. In the modern world, he believed, expertise is essential and inescapable. Public problems, Laski wrote, have grown much too technical and complex to be grasped by those without special training, and certainly not by the “plain man.” However, experts bring what we might call today occupational disabilities: They can rarely see beyond their particular subject. They are intolerant of “novel views,” particularly coming from experts in other fields. Convinced their conclusions are right, they lack humility and may “fail to see the obvious which is before their very noses.” Not least importantly, experts often confuse the facts they know with proposals for what to do about them, which are often rooted in unexamined premises, not shared by those likely to be most affected. “The expert tends,” Laski concludes, “to make his subject the measure of life, instead of making life the measure of his subject.”

To avoid these problems, Laski recommended that experts should be on tap, but not on top, a phrase he had used a few years earlier in a letter to Justice Holmes. Authority over public affairs should be in the hands of “statesmen” who have wide experience in governing. They should use “supreme common sense” to determine “the limits of the possible,” mediating between what the experts desire and what the “plain man” will accept. Ironically, despite the growing importance of specialized knowledge, successful choices still had to be made by the talented “amateur,” by the person who knows a little about a lot, rather than a lot about a little.

Although the examples Laski used are now dated, parallels with public efforts to deal with the coronavirus pandemic are not hard to draw. They also raise a question that Laski would assuredly have asked if he were still alive. (He died in

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1950 – from influenza.) Since “The Limitations of the Expert” appeared, government has become increasingly reliant on specialized knowledge, as the response to the Covid 19 crisis illustrates. Have we become much better at populating government with experts than in cultivating statesmen with the experience and wisdom to make good use of them?

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## The Limitations of the Export

The day of the plain man has passed. No criticism of democracy is more fashionable in our time than that which lays emphasis upon his incompetence. This is, we are told, a big and complex world, about which we have to find our way at our peril. The plain man is too ignorant and too uninterested to be able to judge the adequacy of the answers suggested to our problems. As in medicine we go to a doctor, or in bridge-building to an engineer, so in matters of social policy we should go to an expert in social questions. He alone, we are told with increasing emphasis, can find his way about the labyrinthine intricacies of modern life. He alone knows how to find the facts and determine what they mean. The plain man is simply obsolete in a world he has never been trained to understand. Either we must trust the making of fundamental decisions to experts, or there will be a breakdown in the machinery of government.

Now much of this skepticism is a natural and justifiable reaction from the facile and romantic optimism of the nineteenth century. Jefferson in America, Bentham in England did too easily assume not only an inherent rightness in the opinions of the multitude but also an instinctive wisdom in its choices. They did tend to think that social problems could be easily understood and that public interest in their solution would be widespread and passionate. From their philosophy was born the dangerous inference that any man, without training in affairs, could hope usefully to control their operation. They did not see that merely to formulate rightly the nature of a social problem is far more difficult than to formulate rightly a problem in physics or chemistry. No one assumes that the plain man is entitled to an opinion about the ether or vitamins or the historicity of the Donation of Constantine. Why should it be assumed that he has competence about the rates of taxation, or the validity of tariff-schedules, or the principles of a penal code? Here, as in the fields of pure and applied science, his well-being, it is argued, depends essentially upon accepting the advice of the disinterested expert. The more elbowroom the latter possesses, the more likely we are to arrive at adequate decisions.

No one, I think, could seriously deny to-day that in fact none of our social problems are capable of wise resolution without formulation of its content by an expert mind. A Congressman at Washington, a member of Parliament at Westminster cannot hope to understand the policy necessary to a proper understanding of Soviet Russia merely by the light of nature. The facts must be gathered by men who have been trained to a special knowledge of the new Russia, and the possible inferences from those facts must be set out by them. The plain man cannot plan a town, or devise a drainage system, or decide upon the wisdom of compulsory vaccination without aid and knowledge at every turn from men who have specialized in those themes. He will make grave mistakes about them, possibly even fatal mistakes. He will not know what to look for; he may easily miss the significance of what he is told. That the contours or any subject must be defined by the expert before the plain man can see its full significance will, I believe, be obvious to anyone who has reflected upon the social process in the modern world.

## II.

But it is one thing to urge the need for expert consultation at every stage in making policy; it is another thing, and a very different thing, to insist that the expert’s judgment must be final. For special knowledge and the highly trained mind produce their own limitations which in the realm of statesmanship, are of decisive importance. *Expertise*, it may be argued, sacrifices the insight of common sense to intensity of experience. It breeds an inability to accept new views from the very depth of its pre-occupation with its own conclusions. It too often fails to see round its subject. It sees its results out of perspective by making them the center of relevance to which all other results must be related. Too often, also, it lacks humility; and this breeds in its possessors a failure in proportion which makes them fail to see the obvious which is before their very noses. It has, also, a certain caste-spirit about it, so that experts tend to neglect all evidence which does not come from those who belong to their own ranks. Above all, perhaps, and this most urgently where human problems are concerned, the expert fails to see that every judgment he makes not purely factual in nature brings with it a scheme of values which has no special validity about it. He tends to confuse the importance of his facts with the importance of what he proposes to do about them.

Each one of these views needs illustration, if we are to see the relation of *expertise* to statesmanship in proper perspective. The expert, I suggest, sacrifices the insight of common sense to the intensity of his experience. No one can read the writings of Mr. F. W. Taylor, the efficiency-engineer, without seeing that his concentration upon the problem of reaching the maximum output of pig-iron per man per day made him

come to see the labourer simply as a machine for the production of pig-iron. He forgot the complexities of human nature, the fact that the subject of his experiments had a will of his own whose consent was essential to effective success. Businessmen prophesied the rapid breakdown of the Russian experiment because it had eliminated that profit-making motive which experience had taught them was at the root of Western Civilization. But they failed to see that Russia might call into play new motives and new emotions not less powerful, even if different in their operation, from the old. The economic experts of the early nineteenth century were fairly unanimous in insisting that the limitation of the hours of labour must necessarily result in a decrease of prosperity. They lacked the common sense to see that a prohibition upon one avenue of profit would necessarily lead to so intense an exploration of others as to provide a more than adequate compensation for the effort they deplored.

The expert, again, dislikes the appearance of novel views. Here, perhaps, the experience of science is most suggestive since the possibility of proof in this realm avoids the chief difficulties of human material. Everyone knows of the difficulties encountered by Jenner in his effort to convince his medical contemporaries of the importance of vaccination. The Royal Society refused to print one of Joule's most seminal papers. The opposition of men like Sir Richard Owen and Adam Sedgwick to Darwin resembled nothing so much as that of Rome to Galileo. Not even so great a surgeon as Simpson could see merit in Lister's discovery of antiseptic treatment. The opposition to Pasteur among medical men was so vehement that he declared regretfully that he did not know he had so many enemies. Lacroix and Poisson reported to the French Academy of Sciences that Galois' work on the theory of groups, which Cayley later put among the great mathematical achievements of the nineteenth century, was quite unintelligible. Everyone knows how biologists and physicists failed to perceive for long years the significance of Gregor Mendel and Willard Gibbs.

These are instances from realms where, in almost every case, measurable proof of truth was immediately obtainable; and, in each case, novelty of outlook was fatal to a perception of its importance. In social matters, where the problem of measurement is infinitely more difficult, the expert is entitled to far less assurance. He can hardly claim that any of his fundamental questions have been so formulated that he can be sure that the answer is capable of a certainly right interpretation. The student of race, for instance, is wise only if he admits that his knowledge of his subject is mainly a measure of his ignorance of its boundaries. The student of eugenics can do little more than insist that certain hereditary traits, deaf-mutism, for example, or hemophilia, make breeding from the stocks tainted by them undesirable; he cannot tell us what fitness means nor show us how to breed the qualities upon which racial adequacy depends. It would be folly to say that

we are destined never to know the laws which govern life; but, equally certainly, it would be folly to argue that our knowledge is sufficient to justify any expert, in any realm of social importance, claiming finality for his outlook.

He too often, also, fails to see his results in their proper perspective. Anyone who examines the conclusions built, for example, upon the use of intelligence tests will see that this is the case. For until we know exactly how much of the ability to answer the questions used as their foundation is related to differentiated home environment, how effectively, that is, the experiment is really pure, they cannot tell us anything. Yet the psychologists who accept their results have built upon them vast and glittering generalizations as, for instance, about the inferior mental quality of the Italian immigrant in America; as though a little common sense would not make us suspect conclusions indicating mental inferiority in the people which produced Dante and Petrarch, Vico and Machiavelli. Generalizations of this kind are merely arrogant; and their failure to see, as experts, the *a priori* dubiety of their results, obviously raises grave issues about their competence to pronounce upon policy.

Vital, too, and dangerous, is the expert's caste-spirit. The inability of doctors to see light from without is notorious; and a reforming lawyer is at least as strange a spectacle as one prepared to welcome criticism of his profession from men who do not practise it. There is, in fact, no expert group which does not tend to deny that truth may possibly be found outside the boundary of its private Pyrenees. Yet, clearly enough, to accept its dicta as final, without examination of their implications, would be to accept grave error as truth in almost every department of social effort. Every expert's conclusion is a philosophy of the second best until it has been examined in terms of a scheme of values not special to the subject matter of which he is an exponent.

Everyone knows, for example, that admirals invariably fail to judge naval policy in adequate terms and in Great Britain, at any rate, the great military organizers, men like Cardwell and Haldane, have had to pursue their task in face of organized opposition from the professional soldier. The Duke of Wellington was never brought to see the advantage of the breech-loading rifle, and the history of the tank in the last war is largely a history of civilian enterprise the value of which the professional soldier was brought to see only with difficulty.

The expert, in fact, simply by reason of his immersion in a routine, tend to lack flexibility of mind once he approaches the margins of his special theme. He is incapable of rapid adaptation to novel situations. He unduly discounts experience which does not tally with his own. He is hostile to views which are not set out in terms he has been accustomed to handle. No man is so adept at realizing difficulties within the field that he knows; but, also, few are so incapable of meeting

situations outside that field. Specialism seems to breed a horror of unwonted experiment, a weakness in achieving adaptability, both of which make the expert of dubious value when he is in supreme command or a situation.

This is, perhaps, above all because the expert rarely understands the plain man. What he knows, he knows so thoroughly that he is impatient with men to whom it has to be explained. Because he practices a mystery, he tends to assume that, within his allotted field, men must accept without question the conclusions at which he has arrived. He too often lacks that emollient quality which makes him see that conclusions to which men assent are far better than conclusions which they are bidden, without persuasion, to decline at their peril. Everyone knows how easily human personality becomes a unit in a statistical table for the bureaucrat; and there must be few who have not sometimes sympathized with the poor man's indignation at the social worker. People like Jane Addams, who can retain, amid their labors, a sense of the permanent humanity of the poor are rare enough to become notable figures in contemporary life.

The expert, in fact, tends to develop a certain condescension towards the plain man which goes far towards the invalidation of his *expertise*. Men in India who have become accustomed to the exercise of power, cannot believe, without an imaginative effort of which few of them are capable, that the Indian is entitled to his own ideas of how he should be governed. Civil servants tend easily to think that Members of Parliament or Congress are an ignorant impediment to their labors. Professional historians who cultivate some minute fragment of an epoch's history, cannot appreciate the superb incursions of a brilliant amateur like Mr. H. G. Wells. It has taken professional economists more than a generation to realize that the trade unions have a contribution to make to the understanding of industrial phenomena without which their own interpretation is painfully incomplete.

There is, in fact, not less in the expert's mind than in that of the plain man what Mr. Justice Holmes has termed an "inarticulate major premise" quite fundamental to his work. I have known an expert in the British Foreign Office whose advice upon China was built upon the assumption that the Chinese have a different human nature from that of the Englishmen; and what was, in fact, an obvious private prejudice was, for him, the equally obvious outcome of a special experience which could not brook contradiction. Judges of the Supreme Court have had no difficulty in making the Fourteenth Amendment the embodiment of the *laissez faire* philosophy of the nineteenth century; and few of them have realized that they were simply making the law express their unconscious dislike of governmental experiment. The history of trade-union law in England is largely an attempt, of course mainly unconscious, by judicial experts to disguise their dislike of working-men's organization in terms of a

mythology to which the convenient name of "public policy" could be attached. The attitude of the British High Command to the death penalty, of lawyers like Lord Eldon to the relaxation of penal severity, of business men to secrecy in finance, of statesmen to proposals for institutional reconstruction are all revelations of the expert's dislike of abandoning premises which, because he has grown accustomed to them, he tends to equate with the inevitable foundations of truth.

The expert tends, that is to say, to make his subject the measure of life, instead of making life the measure of his subject. The result, only too often, is an inability to discriminate, a confusion of learning with wisdom. "The fixed person for the fixed duties," Professor Whitehead has written, "who in older societies was such a godsend, in the future will be a public danger." In a sense, indeed, the more expert such fixed persons are, the more dangerous they are likely to be. For your great chemist, or doctor, or engineer, or mathematician is not an expert about life; he is precisely an expert in chemistry or medicine, engineering or mathematics. And the more highly expert he is, the more profoundly he is immersed in his routine, the less he is likely to know of the life about him. He cannot afford the time or the energy to give to life what his subject demands from him. He restrains his best intellectual effort within the routine about which he is a specialist. He does not coordinate his knowledge of a part with an attempt at wisdom about the whole.

This can be seen from many angles. Lord Kelvin was a great physicist, and his discoveries in cable-laying were of supreme importance to its development; but when he sought to act as a director of a cable-laying company, his complete inability to judge men resulted in serious financial loss. Faraday was obviously one of the half-dozen outstanding physicists of modern times; but in the field of theological belief, he retained convictions which no man of common sense could accept. Mr. Henry Ford is obviously a business man of genius; but, equally obviously, his table talk upon themes outside his special sphere reveals a mentality which is mediocre in the extreme. Charles Babbage rendered immense service to the development of statistical science; but when he came to judge one of Tennyson's most famous poems he missed its beauty through an over-vivid sense of its failure to conform to the revelations of the census returns.

The expert, in short, remains expert upon the condition that he does not seek to co-ordinate his specialism with the total sum of human knowledge. The moment that he seeks that co-ordination he ceases to be an expert. A doctor, a lawyer, an engineer who sought to act in terms of his specialism as President or Prime Minister would inevitably fail; to succeed, he must cease to be an expert. The wisdom that is needed for the direction of affairs is not an expert technic but a balance



equilibrium. It is a knowledge of how to use men, a faculty of judgment about the practicability of principles. It consists not in the possession of specialized knowledge, but in a power to utilize its results at the right moment, and in the right direction.

### III.

My point may, perhaps, be made by saying that *expertise* consists in such an analytic comprehension of a special realm of facts that the power to see that realm in the perspective of totality is lost. Such analytic comprehension is purchased at the cost of the kind of wisdom essential to the conduct of affairs. The doctor tends to think of men as patients; the teacher sees them as pupils; the statistician as units in a table. Bankers too often fail to realise that there is humanity even in men who have no cheque-books; Marxian socialists see sinister economic motive in the simplest expressions of the universal appetite for power. To live differently is to think differently; and to live as an expert in a small division of human knowledge is to make its principles commensurate with the ultimate deposit of historic experience. Not in that way does wisdom come.

Because a man is an expert on medieval French history, that does not make him the best judge of the disposition of the Saar Valley in 1919. Because a man is a brilliant prison doctor, that does not make him the person who ought to determine the principles of a penal code. The skill of the great soldier does not entitle him to decide upon the scale of military armament; just as no anthropologist, simply as an anthropologist, would be a fitting governor for a colonial territory peopled by native races. To decide wisely, problems must be looked at from an eminence. Intensity of vision destroys the sense of proportion. There is no illusion quite so fatal to good government as that of the man who makes his expert insight the measure of social need. We do not get progress in naval disarmament when admirals confer. We do not get legal progress from meetings of Bar associations. Congresses of teachers seem rarely to provide the means of educational advance. The knowledge of what can be done with the results obtained in special disciplines seems to require a type of co-ordinating mind to which the expert, as such, is simply irrelevant.

This may be looked at from two points of view. "Political heads of departments are necessary," said Sir William Harcourt, "to tell the civil service what the public will not stand." That is, indeed, an essential picture of the place of the expert in public affairs. He is an invaluable servant and an impossible master. He can explain the consequences of a proposed policy, indicate its wisdom, measure its danger. He can point out possibilities in a proposed line of action. But it is of the essence of public wisdom to take the final initiative out of his hands,

For any political system in which a wide initiative belongs to the expert is bound to develop the vices of bureaucracy. It will lack

insight into the movement and temper of the public mind. It will push its private nostrums in disregard of public wants. It will become self-satisfied and self-complacent. It will mistake its technical results for social wisdom, and it will fail to see the limits within which its measures are capable of effective application. For the expert, by definition, lacks contact with the plain man. He not only does not know what the plain man is thinking; he rarely knows how to discover his thoughts. He has dwelt so austere in his laboratory or his study that the content of the average mind is a closed book to him. He is at a loss how to manipulate the opinions and prejudices which he encounters. He has never learned the art of persuading men into acceptance of a thing they only half understand. He is remote from the substance of their lives. Their interests and hopes and fears have never been the counters with which he has played. He does not realize that, for them, his technical formulæ do not carry conviction because they are, as formulæ, incapable of translation into terms of popular speech. For the plain man, he is remote, abstract, alien. It is only the juxtaposition of the statesman between the expert and the public which makes specialist conclusions capable of application.

That, indeed, is the statesman's basic task. He represents, at his best, supreme common sense in relation to *expertise*. He indicates the limits of the possible. He measures what can be done in terms of the material at his disposal. A man who has been for long years in public affairs learns the art of handling men so as to utilize their talents without participating in their experience. He discovers how to persuade antagonistic views. He finds how to make decisions without giving reasons for them. He can judge almost by intuition the probable results of giving legislative effect to a principle. He comes to office able to coordinate varied aspects of *expertise* into something which looks like a coherent program. He learns to take risks, to trust to sub-conscious insight instead of remaining dependent upon reasoned analysis. The expert's training is, as a rule, fatal to these habits which are essential to the leadership of a multitude. That is why, for example, the teacher and the scholar are rarely a success in politics. For they have little experience of the need for rapid decision; and their type of mental discipline leads them to consider truth in general rather than the truth of popular discussion. They have not been trained to the business of convincing the plain man, and modern government is impossible to those who do not possess this art.

Nothing, indeed, is more remarkable in a great public department than to watch a really first-rate public man drive his team of expert officials. He knows far less than they do of the affairs of the Department. He has to guess at every stage the validity of their conclusions. On occasion, he must either choose between alternatives which seem equally balanced or decide upon a policy of which his officials disapprove. Not seldom, he must quicken their doubts into certainties; not seldom, also, he must persuade them into paths they have thus far refused to tread. The whole difference between a great Minister and a poor one lies in his ability to utilize his officials

as instruments. His success depends upon weaving a policy from the discrete threads of their *expertise*. He must discover certain large principles of policy and employ them in finding the conditions of its successful operation. He must have the power to see things in a big way, to simplify, to co-ordinate, to generalize. Anyone who knows the work of Lord Haldane at the British War Office from 1906 to 1911, or of Mr. Arthur Henderson as Foreign Secretary in the last eighteen months, can understand the relation between the statesman and his expert which makes, and which alone can make, for successful administration.

Its essence, as a relation, is that the ultimate decisions are made by the amateur and not by the specialist. It is that fact which gives them coherence and proportion. A cabinet of experts would never devise a great policy. Either their competing specialisms would clash, if their *expertise* was various in kind, or its perspective would be futile because it was similar. The amateur brings to them the relevance of the outer world and the knowledge of men. He disposes of private idiosyncrasy and technical prejudice. In convincing the non-specialist Minister that a policy propounded is either right or wrong, the expert is already half-way to convincing the public of his plans; and if he fails in that effort to convince, the chances are that his plans are, for the environment he seeks to control, inadequate or mistaken. For politics by its nature is not a philosophy of technical ideals, but art of the immediately practical. And the statesman is pivotal to its organization because he acts as the broker of ideas without whom no bridges can be built between the expert and the multitude. It is no accident, but an inherent quality of his character, that the expert distrusts his fellow specialist when the latter can reach that multitude. For him the gift of popular explanation is a proof of failure in the grasp of the discipline. His intensity of gaze makes him suspect the man who can state the elements of his mystery in general terms. He knows too much of minutiae to be comfortable upon the heights of generalization.

Nor must we neglect the other aspect of the matter. “The guest,” said Aristotle with his homely wisdom, “will judge better of a feast than the cook.” However much we may rely upon the expert in formulating the materials for decision, what ultimately matters is the judgment passed upon the results of policy by those who are to live by them. Things done by government must not only appear right to the expert; their consequences must seem right to the plain and average man. And there is no way known of discovering his judgment save by deliberately seeking it. This, after all, is the really final test of government; for, at least over any considerable period, we cannot maintain a social policy which runs counter to the wishes of the multitude.

It is not the least of our dangers that we tend, from our sense of the complexity of affairs, to underestimate both the relevance and the significance of those wishes. We are so impressed by the plain man’s ignorance that we tend to think

his views may be put aside as unimportant. Not a little of the literature upon the art of government to-day is built upon the supposition that the plain man has no longer any place in social economy. We know, for example, that he does not understand the technicalities of the gold standard. It is clear that it would be folly to consult him upon matters like the proper area for the generation of electricity supply, or the amount that it is wise for a government to spend in testing the action of pavements under changing temperatures and variations of load. But the inference from a knowledge that the plain man is ignorant of technical detail and, broadly speaking, uninterested in the methods by which its results are attained, is certainly not the conclusion that the expert can be left to make his own decisions.

For the results of the gold standard are written plain in the life of the average man. The consequences of an inefficient electricity supply are apparent to him every day. It is his motor-car which uses the roads, and he makes up his mind about the quality of the road service with which he is provided. Every degree by which he is separated from consultation about decisions is a weakening of the governmental process. Neither goodwill in the expert nor efficiency in the performance of his function ever compensates in a state for failure to elicit the interest of the plain man in what is being done. For the nature of the result is largely unknown save as he reports his judgment upon it; and only as he reports that judgment can the expert determine in what direction his plans must move. Every failure in consultation, moreover, separates the mind of the governors from those who are governed; this is the most fertile source of misunderstanding in the state. It is the real root of impermanence of autocracies which fail from their inability to plumb the minds of those by whose opinions, ultimately, they must live.

The importance of the plain man’s judgment is, in short, the foundation upon which the expert, if he is to be successful, must seek to build. It is out of that judgment, in its massive totality, that every society forms its schemes of values. The limits of possible action in society are always set by that scheme. What can be done is not what the expert thinks ought to be done. What can be done is what the plain man’s scheme of values permits him to consider as just. His likes and dislikes, his indifference and his inertia, circumscribe at every stage the possibilities of administration. That is why a great expert like Sir Arthur Salter has always insisted upon the importance of advisory committees in the process of government. He has seen that the more closely the public is related to the work of *expertise* the more likely is that work to be successful. For the relation of proximity of itself produces conviction. The public learns confidence, on the one hand, and the expert learns proportion on the other. Confidence in government is the secret of stability, and a sense of proportion in the expert is the safeguard against bureaucracy.

At no time in modern history was it more important than now that we should scrutinise the claims of the expert more critically; at no time, also, was it more important that he himself should be skeptical about his claims. Scientific invention has given us a material power of which the possible malignancy is at least as great as its contingent benefits. The danger which confronts us is the quite fatal one that, by the increase of complexity in civilization, we may come to forget the humanity of men. A mental climate so perverted as this would demonstrate at a stroke the fragility of our social institutions. For it would reveal an abyss between rulers and subjects which no amount of technical ingenuity could bridge. The material power that our experts multiply brings with it no system of values. It can only be given a system related to the lives of ordinary people to the degree that they are associated with its use. To exclude them from a share in its direction is quite certainly to exclude them also from a share in its benefits; for no men have been able in the history of past societies exclusively to exercise its authority without employing it ultimately for their own ends. Government by experts would, however ardent their original zeal for the public welfare, mean after a time government in the interest of experts. Of that the outcome would be either stagnation, on the one hand, or social antagonism, upon the other.

#### IV

Our business, in the years which lie ahead, is clearly to safeguard ourselves against this prospect. We must ceaselessly remember that no body of experts is wise enough, to be charged with the destiny of mankind. Just because they are experts, the whole of life is, for them, in constant danger of being sacrificed to a part; and they are saved from disaster only by the need of deference to the plain man's common

sense. It is, I believe, upon the perpetuation of this deference that our safety very largely depends.

But it will be no easy thing to perpetuate it. The expert, to-day, is accustomed to a veneration not very different from that of the priest in primitive societies; for the plain man he, like the priest, exercises a mystery into which the uninitiated cannot enter. To strike a balance between necessary respect and skeptical attack is a difficult task. The experience of the expert is so different, his approach to life so dissimilar, that expert and plain man are often impatient of each other's values. Until we can somehow harmonize them, our feet will be near to the abyss.

Nor must we forget that to attain such harmony immense changes in our social habits will be necessary. We shall have to revolutionize our educational methods. We shall have to reconstruct the whole fabric of our institutions. For the first time, perhaps, in the history of mankind, we shall have, as a civilization, deliberately to determine what kind of life we desire to live. We must so determine it remembering that the success of our effort will depend upon harnessing to its fortunes the profounder idealism of ordinary men and women. We shall appeal to that idealism only as we give it knowledge and persuade it that the end we seek is one in which it, too, can hope to share.

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